The conflict in the southern Senegalese province of Casamance has been one of the most complicated conflicts in West Africa over the years. The 300 km tropical strip of land stretching from the Atlantic Ocean between the tiny republic of the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau has over the years seen some of the deadliest forms of violence.

The claims for independence, that has triggered the crisis, is based on the clouded perception that as a separate territory of French colonial rule, the disputed region was intended to be recognized as an independent state after 20 years of Senegalese independence[1]. This was however refuted by the French historian Jacques Charpy as conspiratorial with no concrete proofs[2].

With the contention by elites of the region that Cassamance should become an independent state, violent demonstrations erupted in the regional capital, Ziguinchor in the 1980s. Senegalese government security forces crossed the demonstrations and the leaders of the Movement for the Forces of Democracy in Cassamance (MFDC) were subsequently arrested and given long-term sentences by the national judiciary system.

In May 1990, the movement officially declared an armed struggle for the independence of Cassamance. The region has since then been in an intermittent state of conflict with numerous peace accords failing to provide a peaceful solution to the impasse.

Chronologically, this paper will proceed in part one with McGowan’s theoretical analysis of conflicts in West Africa. Part two gives a historical background of the region that laid the foundation for the causes of the conflict. In part three the causes and escalation of the conflict are discussed. Part four gives an analytical exposition of the major actors and their respective roles in the conflict. This part will also include the international and regional response to the crisis. In part five, the theoretical implications of the conflict are discussed. This is followed by part six, where I conclude.

1. Theoretical Analysis of Conflicts in West Africa

Post Independence West Africa was marred by an era of bloody military coups and conflicts that has threatened the fabrics of democracy and good governance in the sub-region. From independence through 2004, the sixteen West African States experienced forty-four successful military-led coups, forty-three often-bloody failed coups, at least eighty-two coup plots, seven civil wars and many other forms of political conflicts (McGowan, 2005). Structural peripheral poverty and inefficient  leadership resulted to underdevelopment and state weakness, the major structural causes of West African instability (McGowan, 2005). Because political office is a quick route to wealth in Africa, people fight for it (Guest, 2004)

From the modern world perspective, state weakness has also largely contributed to the primary structural cause of the varied forms of political instability that have affected the region throughout the post-independence era. At the level of individuals, Mancur Olson and Arthur Goldsmith have persuasively argued that institutional weakness and violent politics created an environment in which autocratic political leaders rationally choose short-term gain than longer-term development (McGowan, 2005). Leaders therefore behave in a corrupt, nepotistic, and rent-seeking fashion that further weakens the political economies of the states they autocratically rule (McGowan, 2005). According to McGowan, both the Micro rational-choice political economic theory of Olson and the macro capitalist world-economy perspective of Wallerstein are driving forces behind the vehicle fueling conflicts in West Africa.

The single modern world capitalist economy that created a global division of labor has also contributed to an intensification of conflicts in the West African region. World System theorists posit that there are three distinct zones within this division of labor: core semi periphery, and periphery (McGowan 2005). Core Zones produce, consume, and export varied products in a capital-intensive, high-tech, and high-wage fashion, whereas peripheral areas produce and export agricultural and mineral commodities as well as simple manufactures like textiles and clothing in a labor –intensive, low tech, and low-wage fashion (McGowan 2005). Such a role played by the region in the world-economy’s division of labor therefore affected the class structure and politics of the region, contributing to competition and fueling of conflicts in the region.

With poverty and the class structures ushered by the single modern world capitalist economy, the socio economic setting of the region has been impacted on a grand scale. Victims of wars and other large-scale collective violence concentrate disproportionately in countries where most people live miserably in other respects as well (Tilly, 2004). The proportion of national populations estimated to be living below the international poverty line with incomes less than $2 per day ranges from Nigeria’s 90.8 to Cote d’Ivoire’s 50.4, with Senegal at 67.8 (McGowan, 2005).

Under such dismal economic conditions, democratization and political stability in most parts of the region remained problematic and opened to renewed military interventions and conflicts (McGowan, 2005). Such economic conditions are the most serious problems to underdevelopment and ongoing economic crisis, leading directly to political instability (Jackson, 2005). At the very least, they create the conditions whereby politics is transformed into a vicious competition for scare resources in which elite corruption, nepotism, rent seeking, and coups become the norm (Jackson, 2005).

For these reasons, the region has between January 2000 and December 2004 experienced five failed coup attempts (three in Cote d’Ivoire and one each in Mauretania and Sierra Leone); a successful coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2003; reported coup plots in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau (two), Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire (two), Mauretania (two), Mauretania (two), and Nigeria; rumors of plots across the region, particularly in Ghana; and serious civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; and the ongoing 30 year long insurgency in the Casamance region of Senegal (McGowan, 2004).

On another token, the nature of West African conflicts in the region has changed overtime. Before the onset of the Liberian civil war in 1989, West African conflicts were of a “classical” type often derived from the regions illogical territorial map, one of the major negative legacies from the colonial era (McGowan, 2005). Such conflicts include three brief interstate wars over the disputed border between Burkina Faso and Mali; rebellions and irredentist movements by ethnic minorities in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger (McGowan), and the Southern Senegalese province of Casamance. In the case of Casamance, Southern Senegal, the backlash of illogical territorial maps imposed by colonial powers also played a pivotal role in fueling the crisis.

Following an in-depth theoretical analysis of conflicts in West Africa, four major questions arise in the case of the conflict in Casamance. First, what are the causes of the conflict? Secondly, who are the major actors in the crisis, and what are their respective roles? And finally what implications does McGowan’s theoretical and empirical finding have on the crisis of the Southern Senegalese region of Casamance and West Africa in general? Before responding to the aforementioned questions it is important to proceed with some background information.

2. History and Background of the Crisis

Historically the Casamance has a diverse colonial heritage due to Portuguese, French and English control for over 200yrs[4]. The region was a Portuguese colony until 1866 when control of the territory was ceded to the British in exchange of territory somewhere else[5]. “Portugal originally colonized the region (including Guinea – Bissau) in the 17^th century and subsequently gave the Casamance to France during Congress of Berlin negotiations in 1886.”[6] The British assume control of the region shortly but finally ceded the region to the French. The region has since them become a French colony until Senegal attained independence in 1960.

Located in the southern part of Senegal, there has been a general feeling among the people of the region that they have been neglected by the national government through political under-representation and economic development.[7]  Traditionally, the region was dominated Christian and animist beliefs. That had also contributed in separating the region from the rest of the country’s overwhelming Muslim population. (Schneller, p25)

Culturally the people of the region are more aligned to the Mandingos, Jolas and Balantes of the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. At times the region has also been more politically aligned with Guinea – Bissau and the Gambia.

Politically it is historically evident that the people of Casamance fought alongside with the Party for Independence of Guinea – Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) during the country’s quest for Independence[8]. During the 1998 civil war of Guinea- Bissau the armed wing of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in the Casamance were alleged to have fought on the side of the military junta lead by the late General Ansumana Manneh.

On that same token both the 2001-2002 and the 2005-2006 parliamentary and presidential elections in the Gambia were also marred by alleged voter registration amongst President Jammeh’s Jola Kinsmen from Casamance and Guinea - Bissau.

 Economically, the region has a great potential for economic development with climate conditions that allows the production of enough food crops. It also has rich forest resources that both the Gambia and Guinea – Bissau largely relies on for timber, and coal as a source of energy.

Now that the history and background of the crisis are carefully analyzed, taking a look at the causes and escalation of the crisis further gives one a full understanding of the intermittent violence that continues to ravage the Southern Senegalese region of Casamance.

 3. Causes and Escalation of the Conflict

  More blood has been shed in this crisis than anyone could imagine. As the conflict continues to evolve around different dimensions, many (including citizens of the region) continue to ponder bout the root causes of the conflict, while numerous others are left in a total state of limbo.

A careful analysis of the regions historical background could convince any one that colonial legacy such as arbitrary boundaries, non-hegemonic governments, and weak links between state and society, elite formation, weak political institutions may be the major structural causes of such a convoluted and increasing deadly crisis.

The existence of cultural and economic ties between the people of Guinea- Bissau, Senegal, The Gambia and Cape Verde is a historical reality that stems from the postcolonial era. The region and Africa in general was well known for its Kingdoms and empires under which economic prosperity and peaceful coexistence transcends violence and political struggles.

Colonial arbitrary boundaries

Partitioning of the African continent by Western colonial powers is largely responsible for the root causes of all the autonomous independence struggles across the continent. During the process of partitioning, the continent was divided along the lines of economic interest with a total disregard for cultural and ethnic ties. The case of Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea – Bissau and Cape Verde are historical realities. The entire region of these three countries was entirely under Portuguese domination until 1866 when control of the territory was ceded to the British and the French in exchange of territory somewhere else[9]. It was such an argument that was illustrated by Boyd. He argued that

Political boundaries make sharp discontinuities in political jurisdiction, but in Africa few of those discontinuities correspond to the patterns of the socio-cultural environment. It has, therefore, been frequently charged that the artificial boundaries of Africa form the basis for conflict between the African states. In order to make their boundaries more congruent with the ethnic landscape, some states might attempt to adjust their boundaries at the expense of a neighbor (Boyd et al, pg 1)

Similarly, Andrew Burghardt mentions how many states and empires view territory as power, the increase in land area enhance power of the state using Carl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel political view of territory as an example (Burghardt 1973).The autonomous struggle by the Movement for the Forces of Democracy in Casamance (MFDC) exemplifies the arbitrary delineation of boundary and division of people of the same culture, ethnicity, religion, and language, in purrs. Similarly, Andrew Burghardt mentions how many states and empires view territory as power, the increase in land area enhance power of the state using Carl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel political view of territory as an example (Burghardt 1973).The pursuit of power and resources in the embattled region therefore became the driving force behind the conflict in the Casamance.

Colonial Elite Formation, and Non-hegemonic authority

Reflecting on the historical background of the region, the French used a system of assimilation to exert influence over their subjects. This has resulted to elite formation and non-hegemonic authority that had a weak link with society. When Senegal attained Independence in 1960, it was such a resultant effect that may have poised the elites of Casamance to embark on a quest for the autonomy of the region.

The failure of political institutions to quickly contain the crisis through constructive means further escalated the crisis to higher heights. Since the pre-independence era, economic and political development in Africa successfully followed the modernization consequences with abysmal challenges.

Under French influence at the time, these theories were the reflection of the trajectories of elite formation and non-hegemonic authority. All was the result of the regions successful integration into the world capitalist economy. One could therefore rightfully argue that Africa was from the very beginning integrated in to the world economy in a dependent and subordinate fashion - as a source of raw materials and cheap labor

Ethnicity

 Apart from the impact of elite formation and weak political institutions, ethnicity has been a fundamental driving force behind the causes and escalation of the crisis. The Casamance is largely comprised of the ethnic Jolas, Balantes and a percentage of Mandingos. Economic disparity between the north and south of the country gave birth to the concept of marginalization that has grown deeply rooted among the ethnic Jola tribe in the Southern Senegalese province.

The Jola tribe, the largest group in an ethnically-mixed region, has traditionally rejected central authority from the Senegalese government. Even the MFDC is a Jola dominated group that was formed thirteen years before Senegal became a nation-state and calls for the regions independence often sparks violent confrontation with the armed forces.[10]  Many analysts for example would contend that the deeply rooted perception of marginalization among the ethnic Jola people of the Casamance became the major reinforcement mechanism to the struggle for the independence of the region.

Such a notion was quick to spread like wildfire among the predominant Jola majority in not only the Casamance, but across the borders of Guinea – Bissau and the Gambia. It could be recalled when “Senegal’s relation with Guinea-Bissau was complicated by the presence of many refugees from Casamance, and by the separatist use of Guinea-Bissau as a rear base to conduct operations.”[11] Senegalese response to the Casamance rebel attacks from bases in Guinea-Bissau was therefore no historical accident. It acted in defense of its national interest; to destroy rebel bases and to contain Guinea Bissau’s renegade General Ansumana Mane, a close friend of the Casamance rebels and an ally of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh.[12] General Mane who hailed from The Gambia and fought the independence war against the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau openly manifested his Support for the Casamance rebels.

 “The subsequent death of General Ansumane Mane, the most influential ally of both the Casamance rebels in Guinea-Bissau and Gambian Leader Yaya Jammeh, improved relations between the two countries. “When the elected president of Guinea-Bissau, Kumba Yalla, was overthrown by a coup in September 2003, President Abdoulie Wade of Senegal and several other West African leaders mediated the new junta's handover to a civilian transitional government.”[13]  Such ethnic problems remain to be the driving force behind the intermittent escalation of the crisis.

Economic and Political Factors 

“Concerns over territory have generated more wars than has any other issue for the period from 1648 to 1989.”[14] Economic and Political forces have driven the conflict in Casamance to a territorial battlefront since the formation of the Movement for the Forces of Democracy in Casamance (MFDC). Due to its rich productive economic capacity, the region has become an important focus area for the economic development of Senegal due in part to its rich tropical environment[15]. The most important source of the conflict is the political dominance of the north over the resource –rich south, known as the “breadbasket of Senegal.”[16] The Casamance region contributes 40 percent of Senegal’s foreign exchange through agriculture, fishing and tourism. The tropical nature of the region made fertility of the land agriculturally viable.[17] “The region is centrally located to facilitate trade with neighboring countries and has some of the largest traditional markets in Senegal.”[18] While Senegal relies on the region as a food basket and its largest traditional market, countries such as the Gambia and Guinea – Bissau rely on the troubled region for timber, coal and wood as a source of domestic energy.

The trade in Cannabis and illegal arms has also contributed to fueling the crisis in the region. The armed wing of the Movement for the Forces of Democracy in Casamance (MFDC) is known to be actively involved in the production and trade of cannabis to enable them purchase weapons and munitions in bolstering their campaign efforts. In a region that is already volatile to drug traders from Latin America, the crisis in the Casamance may very well take a shift for the worst.

 The lack of job opportunities for youths, economic neglect and the issue of land are also contributing factors to the causes and escalation of the crisis. Many young people get easily caught up as a result of scarce economic opportunities, the lack of education and or securing a job. This has left many feeling economically neglected and vulnerable to actors advocating for autonomy and independence. With such abysmal economic conditions, “an aging Andrews Kalashnikov (AK47)” has therefore become a “meal ticket” for most of the roving youths who are found “pillaging villages” and committing gross violations of human rights across the embattled region.

4. Major Actors and Their Respective Roles in the Conflict

The actors in the Casamance crisis change from time largely as a result of the evolving nature of the crisis. However the major actors of the crisis comprise of national, regional and international actors as outlined below:

National Actors

Regional Actors

International Actors

5. Theoretical Implications of McGowan’s Hypothesis of Conflicts in West Africa

This paper largely gave an analysis of McGowan’s hypothesis on conflicts in West Africa, and how the crisis in the Southern Senegalese region of Casamance validates the impact of colonial legacies, ethnicity, poverty and underdevelopment as root causes of conflicts in the sub-region. In the case of the conflict in Senegal, the political economy approach, the world-system perspective, and the rational choice perspective, theoretically strengthened this explanation. McGowan’s work is therefore an in-depth analytical exposition of West Africa’s vulnerability to the “trajectories of poverty, peripherality and political instability.”

McGowan was also able to use the modern world – system developed by Wallerstein and Chase – Dunn to explain how the poor and weak peripheral West African state systems structurally contributed to various forms of political instability. He further ponders on West Africa’s socioeconomic settings as another major contributing factor to instability in the region. McGowan’s assertion further strengthens Jackson’s argument that “the most serious problem for Africa’s weak states is underdevelopment and ongoing economic crisis, which can lead directly to political instability, creating conditions whereby politics is transformed into vicious competitions for scarce resources.”[19] These helps us understand why “elite corruption” “nepotism” “rent seeking” coups and conflicts are the norms determining political evolutions in West Africa.

From McGowan’s World System Perspective, we can further understand that the single capitalist world-economy and the interstate political system created a division of labor that has affected class structures and politics of states in West Africa. By incorporating the single world system and the capitalist world- system, McGowan was able to help us learn that “Africa is today part of a single world capitalist system, and its present structures and processes cannot be understood unless they are situated within the social framework that is governing them.”[20] The deepening of Casamance region’s role in the West African economy by the production and export of agricultural commodities to metropolitan markets in neighboring Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia ushered in a paradigm of tension as a result of the impact it has on the rest of the Senegalese economy. We are also able to understand that “the Classically peripheral role played by all sixteen West African states within today’s global political economy has resulted in class structures dominated by subsistence farmers; by small-scale peasant commercial farmers; by wage workers on some plantations and in mining, transportation, and government employment; and by a small trading –oriented bourgeois.”[21] These are the most important contemporary scholarly finding in the study of West African conflicts. Over the years it has also been largely due to such structures that are deterrents to “multiethnic hegemonic blocs comprising business, political elites and civil service that ushers the formation of strong states.” [22]

By using the socioeconomic factors in the crisis of the southern Senegalese province of Casamance, one could contend that the lack of economic growth, underdevelopment, poverty and the vicious competition for agricultural resources are the propelling agents fueling the eruption of intermittent violence. Short life expectancies, inadequate school enrollments, low literacy rates and low Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) per capita incomes are structurally the basis of such a dismal record.[23]  Senegal’s Human Development, Per Capita Income of 67.8 according to a United Nations Human Development Index Report is a testimony to that reality.

From McGowan’s empirical findings on conflicts in West Africa, we are further able to deduce that West Africa has seen more serious conflicts largely as a result of risk factors such as “poverty,” “low economic growth”and“dependence on natural resources.” “Because of the extensive poverty, joblessness, and economic stagnation in the region from Nigeria to Senegal, for at least a generation, an aging Andrews Kalashnikov (AK47) rifle has been a meal ticket for roving youths.”[24] A gun has given tens of thousands of bored and hungry young men – an increasingly, young women – license to pillage homes, extort money, rape, kill and sow havoc across West Africa.”[25]. In the case of the Casamance, McGowan further makes us understand how dominated ethnic groups that are crucial to the crisis in the region control the “production” and “export of agricultural “and” industrial products.

The study further helps us to understand the impacts of arbitrary colonial boundaries on conflicts in the sub-region. Like numerous other scholars, McGowan could not have said it better that “the regions illogical territorial map,” a genesis of colonial legacy, has further emboldened our comprehension of the conflict in Southern Senegal. Just as rebel forces ignored borders to smuggle arms and blood diamonds from Sierra-Leone to Liberia, so does the Casamance rebels in smuggling drugs and weapons from the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. “Many rebels are engaged in growing marijuana and drug trafficking across the borders of neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to fund their efforts.”[26] These are all due to the historical ties that existed between people of these respective regions.

From this study, we are further able to understand that the Human Development Index (HDI) of West African States shows poverty; underdevelopment and appalling economic conditions as the fundamental driving force behind the vehicle of political instability in the sub-region. With poverty levels still at records high in the Casamance, ending the crisis requires a political economy approach. It is therefore imperative to understand that unless neo-liberal economic structures are effectively used to contain poverty and underdevelopment, the Casamance region will continue to evolve around West Africa’s periphery of conflicts, violence and vengeance. As McGowan Wrote:

“Ending coups and conflicts in West Africa will require a political-economy approach to development in which market-oriented economies with a vibrant capital financial institution domination (this does not exclude participation, however) can get on with the job of capital accumulation and poverty reduction and in which political leaders seek legitimate profits as well as power by establishing and maintaining strong property rights regime, the rule of law and democracy.”[27]

Finally it is also important to note that with the sub regions volatility to drug trade from Latin America, regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU) must all play crucial roles in reinforcing efforts made by both the United Nations, the Republic of Senegal, the republic of Guinea Bissau, and the Republic of the Gambia, in containing the crisis in Casamance. Unless ECOWAS and the AU adopt a leadership and more proactive role towards the crisis, the potential volatility of the Casamance to both West Africa’s newest actors in the illegal trade of drugs from Latin America, the trade in arms, and the intermittent eruption of violence will remain considerably high. The region's powerhouse, Nigeria, must therefore be cognizant of that reality.

7. CONCLUSION

The conflict in Casamance has dragged on for almost three decades now, and no end in sight to the crisis is yet to be determined. Colonial legacies such as arbitrary boundaries, ethnicity, poverty and the regions linkage to the single capitalist global economic system have largely been the driving forces towards the intermittent fueling of the conflict. With the volatility of the region to several actors, brokering and maintaining a peace deal in the quest of ending the crisis has become rather difficult, if not challenging. The crisis has since then become a massive humanitarian disaster for the sub-region, with thousands of people killed and thousands others displaced. Until today, intermittent violence and the deadly effects of land mines continue to ravage the volatile region.

With poverty and underdevelopment levels still high in the region, and with the volatility of the region to Latin American drug barons, and deadly weapons from other global actors, a constructive political economy approach as theorized by McGowan and other modern contemporary scholars of international affairs is therefore required to effectively address the crisis. There is also the need for both a regional and an international approach to the crisis.

Regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the AU must also take a leadership role in reinforcing efforts made by both the Senegalese government, the United Nations (UN), in containing the crisis. Internationally, “political involvement by the former colonial power, France, has also been limited, with Paris seemingly regarding the conflict an embarrassment in its relations with Senegal, an otherwise stable ally hosting a substantial French population and military bases.”[28] Paris needs to carefully look into the root causes of the crisis and take the lead in addressing the fundamental solution to the crisis. A concerted international military presence in the region could also be pivotal in the implementation of a peace accord. In a 21^st century marred by globalization taking a forefront, any failure to effectively contain the crisis will put the embattled Casamance region on the road map to both an economic and political collapse, which has the potential of spreading to neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. 

  Bibliography

[1] African Research Group, “The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999,” ; Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, August 1999

[2] African Research Group, “The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999,” ; Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, August 1999

[3] African Research Group, “The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999,”; Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, August 1999.

[4]African Research Group, “The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999,”; Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, August 1999.

 [5]  Schneller. R, “Does the Cassamance Conflict Deserve US Intervention,”; International Affairs Review, 2001

[6] Armed Conflicts Report:  http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Senegal.html

[7] Ibid

[8] African Research Group, “The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999,”; Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, August 1999

[9] Armed Conflicts Report

   http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Senegal.html

[10]  Senegal: International relations and Defence: EIU ViewsWire Pub Year: 2004Pub Date. signed.Links:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=701177471&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD

 [11] Ibid

 [12] Senegal: International relations and defense :EIU ViewsWire Pub Year:2004Pub Date. signed.Links:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=701177471&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD

 [13] Errol A. Henderson, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Oct., 1997), pp. 649-668

[14] Global Security

[15] Alex Smith, “Refugees Trudge into New Civil War,” The Guardian (London), 24 June

1998, 13.     

[16] Ben Guzzle, “So Long Diouf,” Africa News, 27 March 2000

[17]Audit of USAID/Senegal’s Casamance Conflict Resolution Program 7-685-03-003-P May 30, 2003

.[18] Jackson, “Violent Internal Conflicts”; and Paul Collier, “ Africa’s Revolutionary Routine,” Foreign Policy 142, May/June 2004, pp 82-83

 [19] Immanuel Wallerstein, “Africa in a Capitalist World,” in The Essential Wallerstein, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: New Press, 2000), 64.

[20] Mcgowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1995-2004: Part I, Theoritical Perspectives.” Armed Forces and Society, Oct 2005; Vol. 32: pp. 5-23

[21] Mcgowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1995-2004: Part I, Theoritical Perspectives.” Armed Forces and Society, Oct 2005; Vol. 32: pp. 5-23

 [22] Mcgowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1995-2004: Part I, Theoritical Perspectives.” Armed Forces and Society, Oct 2005; Vol. 32: pp. 5-23

 [23] McGowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Perspectives.”  Armed Forces and Society, Jan 2006; Vol. 32: pp. 234-253

 [24] McGowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Perspectives.”  Armed Forces and Society, Jan 2006; Vol. 32: pp. 234-253

[25Schneller. R , “Does the Cassamance Conflict Deserve US Intervention,”;  International Affairs Review, 2001

[26] Mcgowan. P. “Coups and Conflicts in West África, 1995-2004: Part I, Theoritical Perspectives.” Armed Forces and Society, Hot 2005; Vol. 32: pp. 5-23

 [27] Martin Evans, “The Casamance Conflict: Out of sight, Out of Mind,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, March 2002.