The contemporary Scholars Gottwald and McGowan argued that “adaptive behavior in the foreign policy of small states simply means that foreign policy action of small states arise when the domestic structure (mainly its economy and polity) to some degree are affected by events external to the state.”  

In the case of The Gambia, a shift in foreign policy could largely be attributed to the impact of the July 22^nd 1994 military coup on the tiny nation’s economic and political structure, as a result of sanctions and isolation. It may also be attributed to “maintaining sovereignty,” “security,” and efforts by the 1994 Military Junta to consolidate their grip onto power.

Since his rise to power, President Jammeh’s foreign policy has shifted to different directions of the global political spectrum. Such a shift in foreign policy behavior will imply what  Gottwald and McGowan argued as an adaptation to external events in order to secure satisfactory performance of domestic structures; a regime survival mechanism. President Jammeh‘s “doctored” foreign policy has not only safeguarded his position, but has also garnered him aid, in his quest for sustaining the organs and institutions of his government. A good example was when “he confused the diplomatic scene by restoring official ties with Taiwan without renouncing ties with China. It seems Jammeh wants to play both sides of the fence- a precarious position for a tiny, resource-poor country.”(Sincere, 1995)

With such diplomatic confusion, Gambia’s relation with China soured as Jammeh smartly realized that his government could benefit from what is largely regarded as Taiwan’s “check book diplomacy.” Knowing that he could syphon millions of dollars of aid money by supporting Taiwan’s bid for sovereignty, he quickly recognized Taiwan over mainland China. Until today, The Gambia government’s support for an independent Taiwan has become no secret.  Support for Taiwan’s bid of independence during all his United Nations General Assembly marathon speeches, are living testaments to the aforementioned validity

Also following the suspension of foreign aid in the aftermath of the July 22nd^, 1994 Military coup, “Jammeh, who has since then promoted himself to the rank of captain, reversed Gambia’s foreign policy course that had been friendly to the west, and strengthened ties with Libya, Sudan, and Iran.”(Sincere, 1995). Knowing that structures and institutions under his government will not perform at levels acceptable to political groupings across Gambian communities; the junta quickly shifted foreign policy. An example was the restoration of diplomatic ties with Libya.

Libya’s Dictator Mohammar Gadhafi who broke up diplomatic ties with the Gambia in the aftermath of the foiled putsch of 1981 by Libyan trained Gambian mercenaries, re-established diplomatic relations within just a few months after the 1994 the coup. Even shortly before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 1996-1997, several members of a Gambian Youth group called “The Green Boys” received what many regarded as “revolutionary  training” in the Islamic Republic of Libya. The youth group was largely responsible for the torture, death and terrorizing of citizen’s – the opposition in particular,  during the 1996-1997 election campaigns.

Relations between Libya and the Gambia have since then improve and the Gambian leader has paid numerous state visits to strengthen bi-lateral relations between the two countries. Libya has also given a significant amount of aide in the areas of security, education and agriculture. Shortly after 1994 military coup, President Jammeh adopted an open door policy for Gambian political dissidents who fled the 1981 abortive coup attempt. Most of them are Libyan trained Gambian mercenaries who fought in the bloody civil wars of Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Their integration across communities in the tiny West African State is a testimony to that reality.

According to the EIU Views Wire’s publication titled “The Gambia: International relations and defense,” dated  24 May 2005, Mr. Jammeh has been particularly vocal in his support of the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, paying numerous visits to Tripoli in defiance of UN sanctions. However, in the last few years, The Gambia has attempted to distances itself from Libya as relations with the US improve. Links with Taiwan, Cuba and several Middle Eastern states have also been strengthened, with aid flows from Taiwan being significant, according to pundits. 

Gambia’s relation with Iran and Venezuela has also been significantly strengthened. Until today Iran provides developmental assistance to the Gambia in areas of Security, Agriculture and Intelligence. Venezuela has also given a considerable amount of developmental assistance in the area of agriculture, transportation and the private sector. President Jammeh’s support for Iran and Venezuela was manifested during the June, 2006 African Union summit hosted in the Gambia. The President’s of Iran and Venezuela were invited as special guests of the Gambia leader.

During the early days of the coup, a Romanian plane with a Nigerian crew also landed in the Gambia with weapons from Iran. Although some analyst believed that the weapons were intended for pro-Iranian factions in the Sudanese civil war, the weapons according to other analyst’s were largely intended to be used by the Junta incase of any attempt to restore the regime of ousted President Jawara. Many others contend that some of those weapons were also intended to arm rebels fighting for autonomy of the Southern Casamance region of Senegal.

Following suspension of aid by western donors shortly after the July 22, 1994 military coup, President Jammeh’s shift of gear ushered in a new relation with communist Cuba.

Bi-lateral relations between Cuba and the Gambia was established, and Cuba has since then been pivotal in predominantly the Gambian health, agricultural and education sector.

“Cuba's medical team is active in virtually all aspects of The Gambia's health care system, giving considerable emphasis to preventive care. Cuban doctors work in the most isolated, least accessible villages of the country, staffing clinics, delivering babies, helping with vaccinations and combating malaria.”(Whitney Jr, 2007) What remains to be seen is not only how long relations between Jammeh and his left wing allies will last, but also the impact of Gambia’s foreign policy behavior in the region. 

Shortly after the September 11^th 2001 terrorist attacks, President Jammeh’s support of the war on terror was no hidden agenda. His successful boarding “the band-wagon of the war on terror” was quickly analyzed as another deceptive means of getting on Washington’s good books. He smartly did so only qualifying himself to be an eligible recipient of funding from the Millennium Challenge Compact Account.

Following Washington’s Suspension of the Jammeh government for “serious concerns of human rights violations”, the Gambian leader’s rhetoric’s against Washington and the west was not a surprise at all (Corey, 2006). Since then, Gambia’s foreign policy shifted to the other side of the fence. This was when Jammeh openly voiced support for the Republic of Iran and Venezuela. The invitation of both Iran and Venezuela during the 2006 African Union summit was a living testament to the aforementioned validity.

Although  Dr Touray’s comparative analysis of the foreign policy behavior of small states, categorized Jammeh’s foreign policy behavior as a result of  both “security implications” and “economic disability”, one could satisfactorily contend that “playing with both sides of the fence” is how Gambia’s foreign policy could best be characterized. In comparison to the foreign policy of his predecessor, both governments succeeded in “maintaining independence”, “sovereignty”, “security” and “economic survival.” (Saine 2005). However unlike foreign policy under Jammeh, “the regime of former President Jawara demonstrated considerable leadership and was remarkably successful in spearheading the signing of the African Charter, named after The Gambia’s capital city.”(Saine, 2005) 

What does Gambia’s changing foreign policy therefore portend for the tiny nation and the sub-region in particular? This is the good question many concerned citizens continue to grapple with.

With North Korea as the newest player in the Gambian diplomatic arena, one could only hope that the Gambia does not become a stage for deadly weapons from a rogue state. And that is not what the sub-region needs at this time

It could therefore be rightfully argued that foreign policy under Jammeh has only deepened the country’s dependency and vulnerability to external actors, and made the tiny West African nation a potential hot spot for extremism and fundamentalism. It has also made the region volatile to dangerous and deadly weapons. Time will certainly tell.